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THE UNITY OF THE VIRTUES IN ABELARD'S DIALOGUS
Scott Davis

T

hat a thinker discusses a topic is often noted, while how he discusses that topic is left
insufficiently clear. A case in point is Peter Abelard, "who, .. D. E. Luscombe has
claimed, "first in his time attempted a serious philosophical discussion of natural virtue
and who first really put the human virtues upon the theological map." 1 Despite continuing
interest in Abelard, and his ethics in particular, little has been done to illuminate what he
takes a virtue to be, how the virtues are interrelated, and how Abelard's account compares
to other treatments of the virtues. This paper attempts, if only in a preliminary fashion, to
answer some of these questions, and to suggest what implications follow from those
answers.
Only recently has extensive work on the details of medieval moral thought begun to be
carried out by philosophers working in the analytic tradition. Thus we are greatly indebted
to, and in some sense at the mercy of, scholars of the past, and one name holds a
recognizable preeminence. That, of course, is Odon Lottin. Consequently, when Lottin,
discussing the definition of the virtues in the 12th century, suggests that "Hugh of Sr.
Victor marks the beginnings of a theological current, of Augustinian inspiration; {while]
Peter Abelard inaugurates a more philosophical current, of Aristotelian origin ," 2 it bears
the authority of an immense scholarship. If our concern is \Vith the detailed workings of
the virtues, however, it is not clear that this claim can be sustained. I propose lo
demonstrate this by contrasting Aristotle's account of the unity of the virtues with that
found in Abelard's Dialogue.
What, for Aristotle, is a \lirtue? In the broadest sense, a virtue is an acquired disposition, which determines, in whole or in part, the character of an individual. It is not, of
course, just any old disposition, but the sort which renders the individual in question
good . Furthermore, possession of the virtue docs not make that individual good in some
merely adventitious way, as , for example, the way a dead swordfish might serve as a good
weapon for repelling a mugger. Rather, a virtue renders the individual who possesses it
good after its kind.
Aristotle is not primarily interested in the many and various virtues of all species, but in
the virtues of human character. and the ways in which they contribute to Jiving the good
life. In particular, Aristotle asks us to reflect on the conditions that would have to be
satisfied for us to say that a person deserved our praise for the life he had created, and the
acts which constituted ii. One criterion, plainly, is that the life be of a certain quality, but
this is not s ufficient. In a world of contingency and travail it may happen that I benefic
myself and others in spite of my own lack of ability, or even in spite of my downright
nastiness. But we do not dispense praise for dumb luck, much less thwarted meanness,
and so Aristotle suggests that it is not enough that the acts which make up a life be of the
·right sort:
Rather, the agent must also be in the right state when he does them. First, he
must know [that he is doing virtuous actions}; second, he must decide on them,
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and decide on them for themselves; and third, he must also do them from a finn
and unchanging state. 3
These conditions are nor different in essence from those to be met by any craftsman or
skilled perfonner, and virtue, for Aristotle, is a craft. The person of virtue does not merely
live the good life, he creates it, and those skills needed to shape that life are what we call
the cardinal virtues.
What does it mean to think of virtue as a craft? I have already noted that it is acquired,
rather than inborn, and this acquisition is a matter of training and practice. Less frequently
recognized is the fact that when a virtue, or any other skill, is acquired, the agent acquires
the ability to perceive what is congruent with that virtue, and thus what is needed for the
success of a given enterprise. This is the case for any complex practice, but perhaps an
example will help. Consider a major league third baseman. No matter how well he has
learned the received wisdom about playing his position, it will do him no good at all
unless, when the ball is hit, he anticipates, and reacts~ and sizes up the situation. So, even
if he gets to the ball there may be only a split second in which to decide whether or n~ t.o
get the out at first or try for the double play. Though it may often look to be the case, thts ts
not simply a matter of instinct, for at any given point the sequence of actions to be pursued
is underdetermined and thus requires some act directed to one among a number of
competing possibilities. And while being a great ballplayer typically requires great natural
ability, the great plays display not the talent alone, but that natural ability perfected by
virtue.
We need and acquire the virtues we do because of the way the world is. Humans are a
natural kind, with specific physical, psychological and social requirements. To achieve
and sustain these is to flourish after our kind. 4 As we acquire the virtues, and as we grow
more perfect in them through continual practice, the more we come to see the world
aright. Given the proper training, and subjected to regular practice, the virtues shape o~r
perceptions and dispose us to do what is in accord with them. An instance of this that IS
particularly illuminating occurs in Aristotle's discussion of temperance. This virtue he
distinguishes from the similar trait of continence:
. . . the continent and the temperate person are both the sort to do nothing in
conflict with reason because of bodily pleasures; but the continent person has
base appetites, and the temperate person lacks them. The temperate person is the
sort to find nothing pleasant that conflicts with reason; the continent is the sort
to find such things pleasant but not to be led by them. s
The temperate person has internalized a genuine virtue, which has an epistemic aspect
that enables him to see what is appropriate. so that when given the option of having

another liter of wine, he.simply is not interested, not because he is insensible to wine, or
doe.~. not enjoy it, but simply because another liter is contrary to right reason. The
comment person, on the other hand, finds himself in an intennediate position. He does not
have the virtue, and so is tempted by the proffered wine, but at the same time he is aware
that drinking
. any more is a bad idea. Were he in full possession of the virtue reason and
perception would be one, in no need of further guidance. Furthennore, his reactions to
~
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stimuli would reflect that fact. But as it stands he is not a fully cognizant moral agent; he
requires some external source of practical knowledge.
Virtues not only incline an agent to certain acts, but make it possible for the agent to
recognize and initiate the act as well. How then, on this account, are the virtues unified? It
would seem that for Aristotle the virtues are unified because of the way the world is.
Possessing one virtue makes it possible to recognize what is fitting to another, which in
tum makes it possible to practice the virtues and advance yet further; and the way the
world is determines what is there to be seen. Aristotle contrasts his view with that of
Socrates by noting that his predecessor held the virtues simply to be forms of knowledge,
while he views them as informed, or united by practical knowledge. 6 Thus, if I have made
some progress in courage I will be able to see what is genuinely threatening, what must be
done, and how I am best suited to doing it. But this will, in tum, enable me to see more of
the world aright, as a person of prudence, which in its turn will lead to further fluency
with temperance and justice. Conversely, a poor grounding in one virtue will undermine
the stability of the others. Intemperance will distort judgement so that what courage
requires will become obscure. Without courage it is hard, if not impossible to discern and
to do what is just, and so on. The virtues are rather like a spiral, and to move up or down
on one involves a concomittant movement with respect to the others.
For these reasons it makes little sense, in the Aristotelian context. to talk of, say, a
courageous thief. The thief may be daring, or clever, but this should not be confused with
virtue. Cleverness itself is a capacity "which is such as to be able to do the actions that
tend to promote whatever goal is assumed and to achieve it. "7 But if the goal is improper,
then the cleverness is used basely. The thief has undertaken a course of action that is
contrary to justice and right reason, and it will bring him, in due course, into conflict with
the world he lives in. The courageous person, on the other hand, uses his cleverness and
daring to overcome conflicts in his world and return the situation to a state of hannony. 8
Much the same holds for the rest of the virtues, at least on the Aristotelian account. The
person whose character is such that he deliberates well and typically reaches true conclusions about the goods to be pursued, and the manner of their pursuing is a person of
practical wisdom, or prudence. Prudence informs and unifies the other virtues in the sense
that being able to see what needs to be done precedes doing it, in principle if not in action.9
If we tum to Peter Abelard's understanding of the matter, how does it compare? Perhaps
what led Lottin to place him in the Aristotelian tradition is the definition given of virtue by
the philosopher in Abelard's Dialogue:
·virtue,' they say 'is an excellent habit of the mind ... we call 'habit' what
Aristotle distinguished in the Categories when he locates the first species of
quality in habit and disposition. For habit is a quality of a thing not present in it
by nature but acquired by striving and deliberation, and which is difficult to
alter. 10
This certainly gives the appearance of AristoteJianism, but such a judgement would be
premature. The philosopher has already noted, with the approval of the Christian, that the
true sages despise earthly pleasures, and seek an inner tranquility of the soul as the highest
good of life. 11 What the virtues do is render their possessors ''precipui camis domitores"
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and thus enable them to escape the temptations of sin. This, combined with the fact that
the true philosophers are .. terrene felicitatis maximi contemptores," leads to inner tran·
quility because they are neither burdened by the guilt of their own actions, nor troubled by
the evils that befall them. The virtues seem to be ways of controlling and distancing rather
than crafting, and on this the Christian and the philosopher do not disagree. Consequently,
when summing up the discussion so far, the Christian is made to say that both of them,
"locate the supreme good of man or, as was said, the goal of the good, in the blessedness
of a future life, and the route thereto in the virtues." 12 \Vhatever disagreement exists
between them stems from conflicting understandings of the nature of the summum bonum,
not the function of the virtues.
· Detennining the supreme good rests in determining what law should be followed. The
philosopher is an adherent of the natural law, which , as obtaining from creation, claims the
greatest antiquity. 13 The other options are either the Old Law of the Jews , or the New Law
of the Christians. What role does law play in the theory of the virtues? The particular law
to which you adhere determines what acts are appropriate for you. Thus the law serves as
the source of practical knowledge. In the case of natural law this knowledge stems from
the dictates of reason, which is pennanently implanted in all. 14 It is the role of prudence to
heed the law, and to pass on the dictates of that law to the agent. This transforms the nature
of prudence, so that
... prudence as well as faith or hope, which are common to evil men as well as
to good men, are not to be called virtues as much as they are to be said to offer a
certain guidance or inducement to the virtues. 15

While the Aristotelian virtue is accounted for by a two-tiered analysis, in which act creates
disposition, which inclines to acts that further clarify and reinforce the disposition,.
Abelard's understanding has three levels . At the first level is the law, which is the source of
practical knowledge, indicating the acts to be performed. The act itself is indifferent, and
determining appropriate praise or blame depends
determining the intention with which
it is done, thus treating a three level analysis of moral agency. Consequently, while virtue
and vice are intrinsically good and bad, respectively, other things

on

are so accidentally and through something else~ for example, our actions,
although they are indifferent in themselves, nevertheless are said to be good or
evil on account of the intention from which they proceed. Consequently, when
the same thing is done by different people or by the same person at different
times, the same action is, nevertheless, often said to be good and evil because of
the difference of intentions.t6
How, on this account, do we construe the virtues? They can not relate directly to the acts,
so they must relate to the intentions. Indeed, they are not simply habits, but habits of the
soull 7 which serve to maintain the correct intention, as dictated by the relevant law.
Therefore, they are not so much crafts, in the Aristotelian sense, as they are disciplines.
With knowledge rooted in the law. the role of virtue must be either to restrain or recall the
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soul to its appointed place. This makes it even clearer why prudence is not a virtue:
"discretio tam bonorum scilicet quam malorum prudentia dicitur. " 18
The knowledge exists independently of the intention. The virtue, for example temperance, counteracts inclinations at odds with the law, allowing the soul to sustain the
correct intention. Consequently, in discussing the parts of temperance, Abelard uses the
following language:
Frugality is the bridle on excess by which, for instance, we spurn the possession
.of that which is beyond what is neces sary. Likewise, meekness is the bridle on
anger, chastity on lust, and sobriety on gluttony. 19
The epistemological component having been displaced into the law, virtue is a "bridle"
that preserves the soul from consenting to the promptings of the flesh . Rather than
enabling the agent to perceive the correct way of proceeding, they bring the tempted soul
back in line, feet planted firmly on a well marked road. To put it slightly differently,
Abelard's temperance is Aristotle's continence. 20
At this point two related questions present themselves. First, docs Abelard's understanding of the virtues make Aristotle's sort of temperance attainable at all? Second, what
sort of unity, if any, obtains among the virtues? The answer to the ftrst question rests on
the answer to the second.
By themselves, the cardinal virtues have no inherent unity for Abelard. Recall that
prudence has already been unseated, and may be possessed either by the good person or
the bad. This, of course, makes perfectly good sense if practical reason is seen as directed
primarily by law; in learning the law I grasp that taking bribes is illegal, and also that
Merv's offer constitutes a bribe, but whether or not I am disposed to take it remains up in
the air. I could, it would seem, be prudent without being just at all.
The situation is further complicated, however, by the second level emphasis on intention, together with the third level neutrality of the acts themselves. It suffices for
attributing justice to me if I will that justice be· done, even if I do not actually succeed in
carrying it out. Thus,
whoever is steadfast in this will which we have spoken of so that he cannot be
easily moved from it is accomplished in the virtue of justice even if he has not
yet been perfected in fortitude and temperance. 21
I can be just, for Abelard, by steadfastly willing what 1 have independently leamed to be
demanded by the law. Fortitude and temperance arc needed not for willing what is just, but
for carrying out the act. Once again, Abelard speaks not the language of perception and
craft, but uses the vocabulary of discipline. Fortitude is the "clippeurn adversus timorem"
and temperance the "frenum adversus cupiditatem" which the soul takes up "so that,
strengthened by these virtues, we are able to carry out in deed, as far as in us lies, what we
already will through the virtue of justice." 22
.
Contrast this with the AristotcJian account. If we think of virtue as a craft, what are the
conditions for ascribing it to an individual? First, the agent has to have succeeded in
producing acceptable artifacts. We need not require them to be perfect-what, after all,
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would it mean to make a perfect, as opposed to an excellent pot-but they do have to
achieve a certain standard. Furthermore, they must be produced on a fairly regular basis.
Someone who produces one great pot and never again takes clay in hand is not necessarily
a craftsman. His achievement might simply be a fluke. And if, on balance, the majority of
attempts fail, we absolutely refuse to call the person a craftsman, despite the one great pot.
Much the same holds for justice. An act may have laudable consequences, but unless I
characteristically do such acts, knowingly and for themselves, I am not properly said to be
just. And if all my attempts at justice go awry, it might be reasonable to say I am kindhearted, but I am a bungler, not someone possessed of the virtue of justice-not, at least,
for Aristotle.
With Abelard the case is not quite clear. Since he diminishes the importance of the
completed act itself, it is difficult to understand what role it plays in our judgements. If the
agent is just by virtue of willing what the law requires, and if the successful doing of the
deed does not add to the praise or blame of the agent, what difference does it make? At
points he suggests that they are done out of concern for the common good, but this idea
remains undeveloped. The more fundamental view seems to be that we will them because
they are dictated by the law.
I have argued, so far, that Abelard's vision of the virtues as disciplines does not possess
unity in the Aristotelian sense. While it is true that prudence, justice. temperance and
fortitude will all be present in the person whose goodness is perfect, they are not mutually
interdependent. Indeed, since fortitude .. is the virtue which makes us ready to undertake
dangers or to endure hardships when the situation calls for it,''23 it is perfectly plausible to
attribute fortitude to a thief. He is vicious in willing, and undertaking, what is contrary to
the law, but he is virtuous in his difficult and dangerous undertaking.
In fact, when the philosopher puts forward Cicero's doctrine of the unity of the virtues,
the Christian strongly rejects it as .. patentissime falsitatis insaniam." 24 It is patently
absurd, he thinks, because it seems to imply that virtue is either all or nothing, and ~at
people are either equally wicked or equalJy righteous. What might lead someone to thtnk
this? Here again, the contrast with Aristotle is instructive. On the peripatetic account the
virtues are all present because they are all required to discern the nature of things, and thus
to complete any activity successfully. But there is no external standard against which the
act is measured, and so the Aristotelian has no difficulty granting that an act is just, while
at the same time saying that it might have been better, or that another act might equally
well have served. But if you think, as Abelard (and indeed as Cicero) seems to, that acts
nre mandated by an external law, and that to deviate from the law is ipso facto to produce a
flawed action, then the steps to Cicero's paradox are fairly clear. True virtue measures up
to the ideal; any deviation from the nonn is a defect; to have a defect in one of the virtues
is not to have that virtue; not to have a particular virtue renders someone defective in
general. Something like this underlies Cicero·s distinction later in De officiis between
"true" morality and "everyday" morality.25 The true is the perfect, which is seldom, if
ever, attained. We must content ourselves with the knowledge that we are never, in this
life, genuinely wise or virtuous.
l have, of course, just hinted at the fundamental source of the contrast between Aristotle
and Abelard. Despite the superficially Aristotelian basis of Abelard's account which
'
misleads Lottin. the doctrine of the virtues which underlies his ethics is stoic. This is not
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the place to mount a detailed analysis of the theory of the virtues in Latin stoicism, .26 but it
will be useful to distinguish three aspects of stoic virtue that are operative in Abelard's
account.
First, the stoic understanding of nature sees man as a soul in a body, rather than an
embodied self-mover. This is important because , while the Aristotelian asks what he must
do to thrive , the stoic already knows the answer: achieve the detachment necessary to
attain the tranquility of the sage, ,When pondering the best way to go about their respective
tasks the Aristotelian must consider his own particular upbringing, and the talents and
abilities that he is best suited to actualize. For the stoic, on the other hand, vocational
choices arc by and large at the mercy of fortune, and a proper detachment will lead to
substantial indifference to the vicissitudes of life in any event. What is necessary is to
discipline the soul and the body to their allotted tasks, which are determined by the law of
nature:
But since the most powerful influence in the choice of a career is exerted by
Nature, and the next most powerful by fortune, we must, of course, take account
of them both in deciding upon our calling in life; but, of the two, Nature claims
the more attention. 27

It is the law of nature which gives us both our general and our particular character, and
which, furthermore, establishes what is appropriate, virtuous and upright. How this is the
case is unclear, but need not detain us here. Suffice it that nature dictates what is
"honestum" or upright; nature establishes some sorts of acts as duties; and nature, along
with fortune, makes it possible for us to cultivate the virtues necessary to doing our duties,
and thus living the upright life. This extends into details, as for example the cultivating of
the voice, in which
. . . we should aim to secure two properties for it: that it be clear, and that it be
musical. We must, of course, look to Nature for both gifts. But distinctness may
be improved by practice; the musicaJ qualities, by imitating those who speak
with smooth and articulate enunciation. 28
I cite this for two reasons. First, cultivating the voice is not simply a pleasant avocation,
but a duty, if not perhaps the most pressing. Second, we know it to be a duty through our
knowledge of nature and its law. From the study of the law of nature we learn all our
duties, and their hierarchical relations. 29
It would be nice to stop here, concluding that Abelard is unable to generate a doctrine of
the unity of the virtues as a result of adopting an essentially stoic theory, while refusing to
countenance the possibility of perfection. This, unfortunately, would be only half of the
story. For the Ciceronian account offered by the philosopher is augmented by the Christian. And the expansion is not just generically Christian, but specifically Augustinian.
Having rejected the unity of the cardinal virtues, the Christian retreats, and acknowledges that .. if virtue is understood in the proper sense as that which obtains merit with
God, charity alone must be caJJed virtue. " 30 This is in response to the philosopher's point
that "your own great philosopher, Augustine, affinns, charity includes all the virtues
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under one name ." 31 Augustine makes this point at a number of places, but one of the most
interesting, for our purposes, occurs in On the Morals of the Catholic Church, where he
writes:
If virtue leads to the blessed life, J affirm that virtue to be nothing other than the
supreme love of God. For as I understand it, the fourfold distinction of the
virtues stems from the affects of love itself . . . thus temperance is love giving
itself wholly to that which is loved; fortitude. love tolerating with ease all things
for the sake of that which is loved; justice, love serving only the beloved, and for
that reason ruling properly; prudence, love safely distinguishing those things by
which it may flourish from those by which it is impeded. 32

Note four things about Augustine's account of love as the source of virtue. Cicero's
impersonal law of nature has been replaced by the divine will, which issues its comm~ds
to a soul lovingly disposed to do them . This love then becomes both the source and motiVe
for virtue, and the virtues are not freestanding duties, but modes of service. Finally, the
end is no longer a detachment that achieves tranquility in the face of earthly travail, but a
supernatural end in which this love finds its fulfillment. 33
It is here, finally, that Abelard's Christian admits the possibility of the unity of the
virtues. If virtue is that activity that acquires merit from God. then of course it ~ust ste~
from love. And in this sense, anyone who has this love has all the virtues, as 11 were, m
nuce. This has two consequences. · On the one hand, it makes it possible to avoid the
problem of the courageous thief. Since his courage is not directed by this Jove it does not
obtain merit from God, and is not virtue properly so called. On the other hand, it allows ~s
to explain why we do not attribute all virtues equally, even to those who do possess this
love. For "just as all who have charity are not equally inflamed by it, nor do all prudent
people have equal understanding, so all just persons are not equally just or all equally
strong or temperate ." 3~ Distinctions of virtue reside not in the possession of one craft as
opposed to another, nor the presence of one discipline without some other, but in a
qualitative difference in ardor with which the soul pursues one form of loving service as
opposed to another.
lt is also here that we discover the possibility of attaining temperance in something like
the Aristotelian sense. If the soul is inflamed with love, it loses the need for virtue as
discipline and internalizes the law. My desire to serve is so great that 1 need no prompting;
I am, in short, behaving like a saint. I say only temperance in something like the
Aristotelian sense because the saint has not developed a perceptual ability that is part of
the epistcmic component of the virtue, but rather internalized a law received from
elsewhere. So, when virtue is interpreted in the stoic cum Augustinian sense it is still not a
craft. The episternic component is located not in possession of the virtue itself, but in the
law. be it natural or divine. This, of course, makes the agent dependent upon an external
source of knowledge, which means that no matter how diligently it attempts to actualize its
abilities. it cannot attain virtue if it is in error about the law. Though Abelard does not
discuss it here, he is, logically speaking, as committed as Augustine to the view that pagan
virtues are vices, in the sense that what is done in accord with them does not merit
praise. 3 ~
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What are the practical consequences of adopting this account of the virtues rather than
the Aristotelian one? There is, first, the distancing of the intention from the action. There
is , furthennore , a divorcing of habitual activity from ascriptions of virtues; the more
distant the action from the intention, the less it can plan a role in shaping the intentions
and the dispositions to which those intentions give rise. To put this another way: For
Aristotle the intentions are dependent on the dispositions, which are dependent on the
actions that create them; for Abelard, and the Augustinian tradition in general. the actions
are dependent on the dispositions, which are in tum dependent on the desire to serve God
lovingly. The character of an agent is not something which is shaped hy interaction with
the world, and which manifests itself in the life a person shapes for himself. It is, rather, a
function of a relation to God, and the life an agent desires and anticipates for himself.
Why, finally, is it of any interest to determine the details of medieval moral thought,
about the virtues or anything else? There is, of course , the historical interest in discovering
relations amongst traditions, and in getting the history right: after all , if this analysis is
sound Abelard is, pace Lottin, solidly situated in the Augustinian tradition . There is also
the philosophical task of presenting different options in moral theory and working out their
implications. If, for example, the Aristotelian and the Augustinian traditions arc different
in their structure an attempt to comhine them, as in the case of Thomas Aquinas, is fraught
with hidden dangers. And finally, to understand the historical and philosophical traditions
that have shaped our moral thought may be a necessary precursor to evaluating our options
for the future. For while A1asdair Macintyre, to cite a controversial example, has made
interesting and suggestive remarks about Abelard,3 6 he fails to locate him accurately in the
tradition, and this may undermine not only his account of Abelard , but his account of the
tradition of virtue in general, and what possibilities it offers for the future. Good ethics
may have to wait until we have produced good history. But this, of course, is a subject for
another time.
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CArditUJI Virtues (Notre Dame, IN: University of N()(te Dam~ Press, 1966). in particular pp. 23-31.

Dialogogus int~r Philosophum, Juda~um ~~ Clrristianum. ed. Rudolph Thorrw (Stuttgart: Friedridt Fromann Verlag. J970).

10

pp. II S-16. II. 1986-1992: Virrus. inquiunt. est habitus animi optimus .•. habirum vero hunc dicimus. quem Aristotiles i~

Cnttgoriis distinxit, cum in habitu et dispositione primam qualitatis speciem comprehc:ndit. Est igitur habitus qualitas rei
non.naluraliter insita, sed studio ac deliberatione conquisita c:t diflicile mobilis. The translation is that of Pierre l Plyer,
Prs~t-Abelard: A Dialogue ofa Philosopher wirh a J~. and a Christian (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.
1979), p. 109.
11

Dialcgus, p. 99. II. 1528-1533: Non ut plerique estimant camalium illccebrarum inhonestum et turpem oblectionem. sed
quandum intcriorem anime tranquititatcm, qua inter ad versa el prospera manet quieta et propriis bonis contcnta, dum nu\~a
earn pecca&i ll\Ofdtat conscientia. Absit enim. ut philosophi, terrene felicitatis maximi con~mptores el precipui canus
domitores, in huius vite tul'pitudinibus summum bonum constituerent. . . .

12Dio/ogu.s, p.

104.11. 166S-1668: Ecce ad hoc disputatio nostra perducta esr, ut summum homini~ bonum sive iPsum. ut dictUlll

est , finem boni future vile beatitudinem et, qua illuc pervenitur. viam virtutes ponamus. Translation from Payer. P. 95.
11Dialorus,

p. 98, ll. 1511·1Sl8: Sed quia iu-.ta superioris condictum propositi ronfundende sun nostre cum vestris sententic, ut
potion valeamuseligere. ct tu ex antiquitatc legis naturalis primum tibi locum vendicasti tuum est, qui priore, ut dids. legc.
hoc est naturuli ....

•Dinlogu.r, p.l24. II. 222()..2223: Naturale quidem ius esl, quod opere complendum esse ipsa. que omnibus 11awraliter inesl,
r.uio persuader et iccirc:o apud omnes permanel. • . .

1

)Dialogus, p. I 18.11. 2059-2061: Prudentia itaquc slcul fides vel spes. que malis eque ut bonis hominibus conveniunt, non wn
virwtes dicende sunt quam ducalllm quelldam vel incitamentum ad virtutes prebere. Translation from Payer, p. 112.

1

p. 117. n. 2023-2030: Qucdam et enim bona vel mala ex se ipsis proprie et quasi substantialiter dicuntur utpote
virrws ipse vel vitia; qucdam vero Jl(T accidens et per aliud. Vel uti operum nostrOnJm actiones, cum in se sint indiffc~CJ~Ie.l.
a intcnliooe tarncn, a. qua procedunt, bone dicuntuc aut male. Unde et sepe, cum idem a diversis agitur vel ab eodern ia
dive~il tcmporibus, pro diversitate tamen intentionum Klem opus bonum dicitur atque malum . Translalion from Payer. P.

16Dialogu.s,

lit.
17Dial<>gus.

11

0ial~us.

p. ll5. I. 1986: Vinus. inquiunt, est babirus animi optimus.

p. ll7. 11. 20J3-2Q34.

UQiologus. p. 126. 11. 2266-2269: Frugalitas vero est superflue profusionis frenum, per quam vedelicet supra, quam necessarium
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est, possidere respuimus. Sic et mansuetude frenum est ire et castiras luxurie et sobrietas gule. Translation from ?Jyer, p.
121.
2

0J have developed this point further in a related piece, "The Structure and Function of the Virtues in Augustine's Moral
Theology." forthcoming in the Proceedings of the International Congrt>ss

of

Augustinian Studier. The contrast of

Aristotelian temperance with the Augustinian!Abelardian notion wa:s first developed in my graduate seminar at Columbia
University. II owes much to the seminar in general, and to Mr. James Wetzel in particular.
21

Dialogus. p. 119, II. 2088-2091: Quisquis igitur in hac con~tans est voluntale, quam diximus, ut videlicet ab ea facile dimovcri
non possit, virtute pallet iustitie. etiam si fortitudine et temperantia nondum sit consummatus. Translation from Payer, p.
113.

12

Dialogus, p. 120, II. 2098-2101: Unde adversus timorem fortitude clippeum, adversus cupiditatem temperantia sumit frenum,
ut que scilicet per virtutem iuslitie iam volumus, per has etiam roborati, inplere potentes simus, quantum in nobis est.
Translation from Payer, p. 114.

21

Dialogus, p. 120, 11. 2109-2111: Hec est ea virtus. que promptos nos efficit ad sustipienda pericula veltolerandos labores,
prout opportunum est. Translation from Payer, p. 114.

24Dialogus,

p. 109, II. 1795-1796.

not officiis, 3,4,17.
2

6"fhere is some relevant discussion in Davis, op. cit. The most recent, and most exhaustive discussion o( the influence of stoic
thought in Latin antiquity and the early church fathers is now to be found in Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Trudition from
Antiquity to th~ Early Middle Ages, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. l Brill, 1985). Colish is panicularly useful for her summaries,
discussions of the secondary literature, and bibliography, though she does not ancmpt the sort of reconstruction and analysis

of the workings of the virtues I am attempting to carry out in this paper.
riDe officiis, I ,33,121: Ad hanc autem rationem quoniam m.uimam vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, utriusque omnino

habenda ratio est in deligendo genere vitae, sed naturae magis. Trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, MA: HaJVard University
Press, 1913).
18

De officiis, 1,37,133: in voce autern duo sequamur, ut clara sit, ut suavis, utrumque omnino a natura petundum est. verum

alterum ex.ercitatio augebit, alterum imitatio presse loquentium et leniter.
l9Most importantly, for Cicero, we learn that our first duty is to the slate, and that contemplation and cultivation are les~r
vocations, not to be practiced to the detriment of civic service. This last lesson Abelard knows from De officiis, of course,
but he also knows it from Macrobius's commentary on the "somnium Scipionis. '' The point is important to keep in mind,
for when Abelard cites Plotinus' rourfold division of the virtues at DialogiU, II. 1880-1886, it is not evidence for a
neoplatonic account of the virtues. any more than his citation of Aristotle is ,genuinely peripatetic. The distinction is already
imbedded in a thoroughly stoic context.

:JIJDialogus, p. 110, II. 1824-1826: si proprie vinus intelligatur, que videlicet meritum apud Deum optinet, sola caritas virtus
appe!landa est. Translation from Payer, p. 102.
l 1Dialogus,

p. 109, II. 1804-1806: Omnes quippe virtutes, ut vester ille maximus asuuit philosophus Augustinus. uno nomine

Kariras comprehendit. Translation from Payer, p. 101.
32Quod

si virtus ad beatam vitam nos due it, nihil omnino esse virtutem affumaverim, nisi summum amorem Dei. Namque illud
quod quadripartita dicitur virtus, ex ips ius amoris vario quodam affectu, quantum intelligo, dicitur ... ut temperantia sit
amor integrum se praebens ei quod amatur; fonitudo, amor facile tolerans omnia propter quodamatur; justitia. amor soli
amato serviens. et propcerea recte dominans; purdentia, amor ea quibus adjuvatur ab eis quibus imJ!OOitur. sagacitc::r
seligens. Oeuvres de. Saint Augustin, vol. I, ed. B. Roland-Gosselin, 2nd. ed. (P.rris: Desc1e de Brouwer, 1949), pp.

SC(J[T DAVIS
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174-76. I have supplied the translation. Abelard discusses this passage at Sic et Non, Q. 137.
3

'These issues are discussed in more detail in Davis. op. cit .• as well as in the following: .k>hn Langan, "Augustine on the Unity
and the Interconnection of the Virtues," Harvard Theological Review 72 {1979), pp. 81-95; Oliver 0 . Dooovan. 111t
Probltm uf Self-Love in Sr. Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1980); idem. , "Usus and Fruitio in Augustine.
De Doctrina Christiana I ," Journal of Theological Sllldies, n.s. 33 ( 1982), pp. 361-397. I do not of course wish to suggest
that Langan or O'Donovan would agree with my analysis.

14

Dialogus, p. 110, II. 1828-1831: Sed sicut omnes , qui habent caritatem, non equaliter ea succensi sunt, nee omnes prudentes

equaliter intelligunt, ita nee omnes iusti equaliter iusti sum aut omnes equaliter fortes veltemperantes. Translation from
Payer. p. 102.

lSCf. Augustine, City of God. 19.25. Abelard's most detailed discu.~sion of lhis mauer comes in his Comm£•ntaria in episrolam
Pauli ad Rol'ltllnos, ed. Eligius Buytaert (Tumholt: Brepols. 1969), but 1have not as yet made a careful analysis oftfle issues
there. It seems that pagans can be saved in theory, but only on the condition that they have somehow come to believe, and to
love God. But I'm still not sure about this. One of the most acute studies of Abelard in English is Rich3Id E. Weingart. Tht
Logle
. £11.rD lvme
. . Luve: A Crmcal
. . Analys1s. of the Souriology of Peur Abailard (Oxford: Clarendon Press, t<YIO)
v.ilich
7 '
'
throws some light on these topics.
Alasdair Machi~, After Vinut>. 2nd cd. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), PP· 168-171.
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